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the possibility of improper reporting of futures positions. The latter is illustrated
by evidence that a large short elevator interest, by improperly reporting its futures
positions as "hedges," was able to depress United States oats prices in the
spring of 1952.1 7 Moreover, the Act obviously cannot handle attempts to comer
the futures markets in commodities under its jurisdiction. An example of such
an attempt may be inferred from the price gyrations in the March, 1953 onion
future on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange." It seems to be the opinion within
the trade that an abortive attempt to comer that contract was responsible. 99
That the latter problem has been recognized is indicated by a bill introduced
in both Houses in 1949 which provided for the extension of the jurisdiction of the
Act to eleven additional named commodities and to any other "agricultural or
forest product" that the Secretary of Agriculture, after notice and hearing finds
subject to futures trading under oonditions requiring regulation."' The bill
never reached the floor. The problems of concerted activity and improper reporting are of a nature not amenable to legislative solution, but depend on the
efficiency with which the Act is administered.
97

USDA, CEA, Investigation of Importation of Oats from Canada 1951-52. A complaint
has been issued against Cargill, Inc., one of the largest cash grain firms in the United States.
CEA Dkt. No. 58 (1952). Though a leader in the industry, it has had a checkered career on
the Board of Trade. Compare In re Cargill, Inc. v. Board of Trade of City of Chicago, CEA
Dkt. No. 6 (1940), with Secretary of Agriculture v. Cargill, Inc., CEA Dkt. No. 11 (1940). See
also Cargill v. Board of Trade of City of Chicago, 164 F. 2d 820 (C.A. 7th, 1947), noted
in Validity of Commodity Exchange Regulations under the Sherman Act, 16 Univ. Chi. L.
Rev. 144 (1948). See also Cargill v. Commodity Exchange Commission, 103 F. Supp. 992
(D.C. D.C., 1952).
98 See The Packer, p. 1,col. 5 (Apr. 4, 1953).
11The statement of W. J. Piowaty, "one of the biggest onion men in the country" and a
member of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, in The Packer, p. 1, col. 4 (Apr. 11, 1953), entitled "Grief in Onions-Speculation Plus Long Supplies Equals Trouble" drew a fine of $200
and suspended revocation of trading privileges by the Mercantile Exchange. See The Packer,
p. 1, col. 4 (June 6, 1953); Chicago Sun-Times, p. 58, col. 5 (June 10, 1953); Chicago Tribune,
Part 3, p. 6, col. 3 (June 10, 1953). For a description of the March, 1953 onion debacle, see
The Packer, p. 1, col. 3 (Apr. 4, 1953).
10
H.R. 4685, S. 1751 (1949); Report of the Administrator of the Commodity Exchange
Authority 9 (1949); 95 Cong. Rec. 5388, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949). A more recent proposal
by Representative King of Pennsylvania was to insert the word "onion" in Section 2(a),
7 U.S.C.A. § 2 (1952), "so that onions are added to the definition of the word 'commodity'
for the purposes of said Act." H.R. 6435, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (July 21, 1953). See Chicago
Daily News, p. 24, col. 1 (July 28, 1953).

EMPLOYEE STOCK OFFERINGS UNDER THE SECURITIES
ACT-THE RALSTON PURINA CASE
In 1951, the Ralston Purina Company offered to sell 10,000 shares of its common stock to approximately 500 of its 7,000 employees without complying with
the registration requirements of Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933.1 In an
148 Stat. 77 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. § 77e (1951).
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action by the Securities and Exchange Commission to enjoin the offering,
Ralston Purina contended that its offering was exempt from the provisions of
Section 5 by virtue of the so-called "private offerings" exemption of Section
4(1).2 The District Court and the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit agreed
with Ralston Purina. The Supreme Court, however, held the exemption inapplicable and enjoined the offering. SEC v. Ralston PurinaCompany.3
Ralston Purina based its contention that the private offerings exemption was
applicable upon the fact that its offering was not made indiscriminately to all
its employees but was, rather, restricted to those considered "key employees"
by the management, 4 although this category included many individuals quite
low in the company organization.' In holding the exemption inapplicable to
employee offerings so restricted as well as to those made more or less indiscriminately, the Supreme Court's decision has imposed an important limitation
upon the use of employee stock-inyestment plans. Corporations may be reluctant to attempt to put such plans into effect now that this type of offering may
involve the expense and delays connected with the Section 5 registration
process. 6
That employee stock offerings were never intended to receive a blanket
exemption from registration is shown by the legislative history of Section 4(1).
In rejecting a 1934 amendment designed expressly to exempt all employee stockinvestment plans,7 conferees of both'Houses of Congress indicated their feeling
that
the participants in employees' stock-investment plans may be in as great need of the
protection afforded by the availability of information concerning the issuer for which
they work as are most other members of the public.8
2 48 Stat. 77 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. § 77d(l) (1951). The second clause of the
section exempts "transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering."
3 346 U.S. 119 (1953), rev'g 200 F. 2d 85 (C.A. 8th, 1952) and 102 F. Supp. 964 (E.D. Mo.,
1952). The Court of Appeals decision is noted in 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1144 (1953); 39 Va. L. Rev.
376 (1953). The District Court decision is noted in 51 Mich. L. Rev. 597 (1953); 21 Fordham
L. Rev. 183 (1952). For a report on the oral argument before the Supreme Court, see 21
U.S.L. Week 3281-82 (1953).
4The issuer's definition of the term is of interest: "It would include an individual who is
eligible for promotion, an individual who especially influences others or who advises others, a
person whom the employees look to in some special way, an individual, of course, who carries
some special responsibility, who is sympathetic to management and who is ambitious and
who the management feels is likely to be promoted to a greater responsibility." See 346 U.S.
119, 122 (1953).
,See page 116 infra.
'See Loss, Securities Regulation 244-47 (1951).
7 The amendment, as proposed by Senator Hastings, would have added the following
to § 4(1): "As used in this paragraph, the term 'public offering' shall not be deemed to include an offering made solely to employees of an issuer or of its affiliates in connection with a
bona fide plan for the payment of extra compensation or stock-investment plan for the exclusive benefit of such employees." 78 Cong. Rec. 8,708 (1934).
3 H.R. Rep. No. 1,838, 73d Cong. 2d Sess. 41 (1934). Senator Fletcher, one of the conferees, made a conflicting statement in debate on the floor of the Senate, indicating his im-
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If an employee stock offering is not exempt per se under Section 4(1), the crucial
question presented in the Ralston Purinacase arises: What is the appropriate
standard for selecting employee-offerees who may be the object of a "private
offering" by the employer-issuer?
Justice Clark bases his formulation of such a standard upon the observations
on the distinction between "public" and "private" made by Judge Denman of
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in SEC v. Sunbeam Gold Mines,
which involved an offering by an issuer to its stockholders.0
Judge Denman set forth the purpose of the Securities Act as stated in its
title: "To provide full and fair disclosure of the character of securities sold in
interstate and foreign commerce and through the mails, and to prevent frauds
in the sale thereof ....

,1 He then continued:

Such an offering, though not open to everyone who may choose to apply, is none
the less "public" in character, [when] the means used to select the particular individuals
to whom the offering is to be made bears no sensible relation to the purposes for which

the selection is made. ... To determine the distinction between "public" and "pri-

vate" in any particular context, it is essential to examine the circumstances under
which the distinction is sought to be established and to consider the purposes sought
to be achieved by such distinction.2
As Justice Clark pointed out in his opinion, the courts below had purported
to apply Judge Denman's definition to the Ralston Purina offering, considering
the issuer's desire to create employee incentive through stock ownership as the
purpose for which the selection of offerees was made. Viewed in this way, the
issuer's definition of a key employee as one "sympathetic to management and
... likely to be promoted to a greater responsibility"S clearly qualifies
as a
valid standard of selection, inasmuch as it bears a direct relationship to the
issuer's incentive-stimulation motive.
Justice Clark, however, rejected the lower court's initial assumption that the
reasonableness of the selection in relation to the offeror's purpose is the proper
pression that the conferees had rejected the Hastings amendment because employee stockinvestment plans were exempt from registration without it. 78 Cong. Rec. 10,182 (1934).
However, all other statements made in Senate debate were in apparent harmony with the
view expressed in the conference report. See remarks of Senator Couzens, ibid., at 10,181. See
also 77 Cong. Rec. 2,915 (1933); Interpretation of the "Public Offering" Exemption of the
Federal Securities Act and State Blue-Sky Laws, 36 Mich. L. Rev. 604, 608 n. 36 (1938).
Justice Clark indicated in Ralston Purina that the statement of the conference report is
"entitled to more weight than different views expressed by one of the conferees in
Senate
debate." 346 U.S. 119, 126 n. 13 (1953). See also Loss, Securities Regulation 397 n. 324 (1951).
995 F. 2d 699 (C.A. 9th, 1938).
10

The offerees included some persons who were holders of stock in a corporation with

which the issuer was planning a merger. This fact-that the offering was not limited to the
issuer's stockholders-was important in leading to the court's holding that the offering was
public.
1148 Stat. 74 (1933).
12SEC v. Sunbeam Gold Mines, 95 F. 2d 699, 701 (C.A. 9th, 1938).
1
3See note 4 supra.
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criterion. Instead, he reasoned that since the Securities Act has as its primary
14
purpose the protection of the investor, the entire selection process must be
viewed from the standpoint of te offerees and their protection rather than from
that of the issuer and its motives and hopes for gain. Thus, the applicability of
the exemption "should turn on whether the particular class of persons affected
5
needs the protection of the Act." Clearly, where the offerees are initially in
possession of substantially the same information concerning the issuer which
registration would disclose, the protection usually afforded by registration becomes superfluous.
Applying this reasoning to the Ralston Purinacase, Justice Clark found that
the issuer's key-employee standard of selection was such as would-and didpermit the selection of offerees not likely to have access to such information as
would serve as an adequate substitute for the information to be derived from
registration, and not, in fact, shown to have had such access. This conclusion
would appear highly justified by the list of positions held by Ralston Purina
stock clerk,
offerees, which included an artist, clerical assistant, electrician,
16
access.
of
lack
and
status
like
of
stenographer, and others
Justice Clark's test has the virtue of not ruling out a private offering in the
case of a stock-investment plan for corporate executives, insofar as the executive can usually be expected to possess a degree of knowledge of the corporation's affairs and financial condition sufficient to render unnecessary the protection which registration disclosure might provide. This point of view has expressly been taken by Massachusetts and Indiana statutes. Since 1938, the Massachusetts blue-sky law has prohibited the sale or offering by a corporation of any
also officers
of its securities "to any of its employees other than those who are
7
1951, IndiIn
commission.
state
the
of
consent
express
the
thereof," without
law a
securities
its
of
operation
the
from
exempting
provision
a
ana adopted
corporation's sale of its securities to a director or executive officer, provided
person directly participate in the formulation of corporation
that "such
8
policy."'
Commission
The substance of Justice Clark's analysis was advanced by the 19
as early as 1935, in an interpretative opinion by its General Counsel indicating
various factors to be considered in determining whether an offering is public or
14 See 346 U.S. 119, 124 (1953).
is Ibid., at 125.
16 For a full listing of the nature of the positions held by the offerees, see Brief for Appellant

the
at 6-8, SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 200 F. 2d 85 (C.A. 8th, 1952). For cases indicating
1951);
Pa.,
(W.D.
975
Supp.
F.
97
Degenther,
v.
"quality" of access required, see Campbell
90,106
SEC v. Federal Compress & Warehouse Co., '41-'44 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Decisions
CCH
(W.D. Tenn., 1936); Cristina Copper Mines, Inc., SEC Sec. Act Release No. 3,439,
(1952).
76,113
Rep.
L.
Sec.
Fed.
17
Mass. Ann. Laws (Supp., 1952) c. 110A, § liE.
18Ind. Stat. Ann. (Bums, Supp., 1952) § 25-833 (n).
19SEC Sec. Act Release No. 285 (1935), 11 Fed. Reg. 10,952-53 (1946).
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private. It is important to consider the effects of the Counsel's opinion in view
of the great weight which the Supreme Court has indicated is to be given to administrative interpretations of this type. 0 In effect, this early opinion indicated
that the relationship of offerees to issuer-and thus the knowledge of the offerees-"would be particularly important in offerings to employees, where a
class of high executive officers would have a special relationship to the issuer
which subordinate employees would not enjoy." 2'
Justice Clark discussed briefly one factor which had been designated by the
Commission in its 1935 opinions and its brief in the Ralston Purina case: the
number of offerees. 2" This factor he rejected, seeing "no warrant for superimposing a quantity limit on private offerings as a matter of statutory interpretation. 2 4 In so doing, however, justice Clark indicated that the Commission was
not prohibited from using a numerical test as an administrative guide for determining those offerings which it feels warrant investigation. While the knowledge
of the offerees is properly the ultimate test, the number of offerees would
appear to be a good warning-that such knowledge is not present in a particular
offering. 5
While the Court's decision in the Ralston Purinacase should be approved as
20Such opinions have been said to be "of persuasive force," United States v. Madigan,
300 U.S. 500, 505 (1937); to constitute "highly relevant and material evidence of the probable
general understanding of the times," Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 12 n. 13 (1948),
quoting from White v. Winchester Club, 315 U.S. 32,41 (1942); and to be "entitled to great
weight," Roland Electrical Co. v. Walling, 326 U.S. 657, 676-77 (1946), quoting from United
States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 549 (1940). Perhaps the most forceful
statement is provided by Judge Augustus Hand, regarding a similar interpretative release
by the SEC, in SEC v. Associated Gas & Electric Co., 99 F. 2d 795, 798 (C.A. 2d, 1938): "One
of the principal reasons for the creation of such a bureau [as the SEC] is to secure the benefit
of special knowledge acquired through continuous experience in a difficult and complicated
field. Its interpretation of the act should control unless plainly erroneous."
21 SEC Sec. Act Release No. 285 (1935), 11 Fed. Reg. 10,952 (1946), quoted in SEC v.
Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 n. 12 (1953).
22 In Sec. Act Release No. 285, the Commission advanced the idea that offerings to fewer
than 25 persons should be deemed private. Two states have enacted similar provisions. In Colorado, an offering is deemed to be made "to the general public" where it is made to more
than 50 persons. Colo. Stat. Ann. (1935) c. 148, § 14(3). Virginia exempts sales to fewer than
30 persons. Va. Code (1950) § 13-113(14). Some 18 states exempt the offering of stock to a
corporation's incorporators, some without a limitation on the number of incorporators and
others limiting the number, with limits ranging from 5 to 25.
23However, the Commission had apparently disclaimed any intention of creating a fixed
numerical standard. See Oral Argument before Supreme Court, 21 U.S.L. Week 3281 (1953),
and Cristina Copper Mines, Inc., SEC Sec. Act Release No. 3,439, CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
76,113 (1952).
24346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953).
25Another administrative guide advanced by the Commission in its 1935 opinion is that
of manner of offering. Where a public means of advertising is employed, it is less likely that the
offerees reached will possess the requisite knowledge than where informal means of communications are employed. But the manner of offering although indicative cannot be decisive,
is illustrated by the Ralston Purina case, where only the most informal means of communication were used.
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consistent with the purpose of the Securities Act, it cannot be taken as a solution
of all employee-offering problems which may arise. An area in which the effect
of the entire complex of facts is all-important can scarcely be susceptible to
comprehensive self-executing regulation. Desirable as certainty may be, each
case will in large measure create its own rule, with the over-all purpose of the
Act as the principal guide.
SUPERVISION OF CHARITABLE TRUSTS
In 1943, New Hampshire became the first state to establish a comprehensive
system for the enforcement and supervision of charitable trusts.' Through enforcement of the donor's intent, mismanagement of trusts has been corrected,
and several millions of dollars in previously dormant trust funds have been put
to use for the benefit of the state's inhabitants.2 The present inquiry will be directed to -an examination of the reasons why similar legislation should be
adopted by other states; 3 it will also make definite suggestions regarding the
which should be offered
type of "Model Supervision of Charitable Trusts Act"
4
to the states by the Uniform Law Commissioners.
I
A charitable trust is a fiduciary relationship created by the expression of a
charitable intent in a will, indenture, or corporate charter. This relationship is
present whether the charity is large or small' and whether the class of persons
benefited is broad or narrow.6 It is essential that every state provide some system for supervising trustees because the nature of charitable trusts creates a
special handicap to the enforcement of the charitable purpose stated in the creating instrument. Normally enforcement of the civil law is predicated on the
assumption that when a breach of a legal obligation occurs, the injured party,
motivated by his own self-interest, will inform the court of the breach and del N.H. Rev. Laws

1943, c. 24, § 13a-13n.

2Letter from N.H. Dir. of Char. Trusts (March 25, 1953). This letter and others cited

hereafter were received in reply to questionnaires sent to the Attorneys General of states which
had provided or were about to provide comprehensive reform, as well as to the "partial reform"
states. This material and all legislative and executive papers are on file at the Council of State
Governments (Project File: Charitable Trusts, 1953), 1313 E. 60th St., Chicago, Ill.
R.I. Pub. Laws, c. 2617 (1950) established a similar system of state supervision for
Rhode Island.
4 On August 8, 1953, the National Association of Attorneys General requested the Uniform
Law Commissioners to suggest state legislation concerning regulation of charitable trusts.
Alternative preliminary drafts were submitted to the National Association, and on December
10, 1952, that group resolved that the development of alternative "Uniform Acts" which provide for either permissive or mandatory regulation "would enable the states to select the form
which best meets their individual needs and requirements." Proceedings of the Conference of
the National Association of Attorneys General 155 (1952).
s 3 Scott, Trusts § 375.1 (1939).
6
Ibid., at § 375.2.

